The gist of the electoral mechanism devised by Professors Bogdanor, Carcassonne and Vilanova  is as follows:
1. The “redecoupage” of Mauritius into 10-12 “circonscriptions” with between 4 to 7 elected according to the pure PR system. The report recommends keeping to the current tally of 70 (or less) elects due to the already high elect-to-population ratio by global standards.

2. The “redecoupage” should be done is such a way that each “circonscription” is diversified “communally” etc.
This indeed appears to be a nicely-wrapped gift for democracy and befitting the Christmas season. But as we have often experienced, the contents underneath the wrapping may not be of practical utility to us!  The second point above is the key but most problematic facet of the electoral reform proposal. Can we ever carve out such sociologically-diversified “circonscriptions” in Mauritius? We all know that there are large areas of Mauritius dominated by one community. Mission Impossible?

The other weakness of this proposal is the application of PR to a small number of seats. This can lead to a can of worms.  I will address some of them. I concur with the Professors that mathematically an odd number of elects (i.e. 5 or 7) in each “circonscription” is preferred in order to facilitate the emergence of a majority.  For example to gain a majority of elects with 5 or 7 seats, a party must garner at least a relative 50% of the votes. But in a “circonscription” with 4 elects, a party with as little as 37.5% of the votes can aspire to 50% of the seats!

Page 5 of the report states, “Parce que jouant dans des circonscriptions de taille relativement modeste, ce système produira des effets stabilisants en favorisant la désignation claire d’une majorité et d’une opposition, tout en évitant l’éparpillement dommageable que peut provoquer la représentation proportionnelle dans des circonscriptions trop vastes.” One can easily construct realistic scenarios which go counter to this statement. Consider a 3-way fight between Parties A, B and C in a “circonscription” with 7 seats. Suppose they each obtain 20%, 35% and 45% of the votes. According to the PR proposal, they will respectively have 1, 3 and 3 elects respectively. If we tweak the votes to respectively 20%, 32% and 48%, the split of the seats becomes 2, 2 and 3! Here’s another rather unacceptable outcome.

This time, consider a “circonscription” with 4 seats and there are only Parties A and B contesting and obtaining a relative 60% vs 40% of the votes. In this case, both parties will end up with 2 seats each! These examples clearly demonstrate inequitable results that may emerge from the proposed Hondt’s allocation formula on a small number of seats.

Again on Page 5, the report states “Ensuite, c’est au découpage qu’il revient de respecter des entités géographiques et démographiques homogènes, de sorte que les partis politiques eux-mêmes aient l’intérêt le plus vif et le plus immédiat à présenter, dans chaque circonscription, des candidats qui reflètent la diversité de la composition culturelle, ethnique ou religieuse de la circonscription.” This sounds like an optimistic Christmas wish. Will it ever come true in Mauritius where large territories are dominated by one community? Let’s assume that each party adheres to this concept of sociological profiling  in its list of candidates. Consider a “circonscription” with 5 seats where Parties A and B list candidates from Community X in the first 2 positions and candidates from communities Y and Z in any of the 3 remaining positions. Suppose Party A garners 31% of the votes and Party B, 69%. The respective seat allocation will be 2 to 3. The PROBLEM however is that 4 of the 5 elects will be from Community X. Is this progressive when most likely under the “bloc vote” mentality under our current FPTP system, Party B would have elected all its 5 “Rouge Bleu Jaune Vert” candidates? The problem in this proposal is that even though individual parties adhere to it, the end-result can be highly undesirable!
Lastly, Page 5 mentions, “ Enfin, et ce n’est pas sa moindre qualité, ce mode de scrutin permet de faire rapidement un saut quantitatif important en termes de présence des femmes au sein de l’assemblée parlementaire. “  Pages 10-11 elaborate on the details, “Il suffit alors, en effet, que la loi impose, par exemple, que les deux candidats apparaissant en tête de chaque liste soit obligatoirement de sexes différents. Pour les noms suivants, une présence minimale de chaque sexe peut être exigée. Plusieurs choix sont, à cet égard, possibles, mais l’important est que les règles soient impératives, ce qui garantira que l’objectif poursuivi sera effectivement et immédiatement atteint.” I concur that this proposal more or less guarantees gender mix among the elects but it may not be a “saut quantitatif” as proclaimed. Consider a 3-way fight in a riding with seat allocations of 1, 1 and 3 among the parties. Thus as few as 1 woman out of 5 elects can emerge from this proposal!

Beware of this nicely-decorated “Christmas Tree” electoral report as it has substantial “feet of clay”. Of course, one can say that it is easy to criticise. I reckon there is no perfect translation of votes into seats but since 2000, I have substantiated and I have since remained convinced that a “Vote 3, Elect 4” (or Best non-communal Loser) system in each “circonscription” is most apt in Mauritius in order to imbue ethos such as meritocracy, seat equity etc etc.